This paper examines the optimal non linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure and disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policy under alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the non-welfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of labour of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some foundation in the theory of responsability; further, unlike the other specifications it yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labour supply requirement from disabled individuals.
Introduction
In a couple of papers [Marchand et al. (2003) , Cremer et al. (2006) ] the point was made that there are two ways of interpreting the disutility of labor in the standard optimal income taxation model. Either it represents some taste for leisure or it reflects the physical or psychological pain from work. In other words, in a two-good framework (disposable income and labor) the same utility function can represent the preferences of two different individuals: a leisure-prone one and a disabled one. If this is the case, a social planner who wants to distinguish them, more precisely discriminate in favor of the disabled, might be unable to do so in a setting of asymmetric information. In 
The fundamental question one faces with this issue of indistinguishability is what
welfare criterion to use. More specifically, should one use a welfarist approach giving more weight to the disabled individuals or should one use a "paternalistic" non-welfarist approach? In this paper we argue that the correct approach is the second one and that it can be justified on the basis of the distinction made by Roemer (1998) between responsibility and luck.
Accordingly, individuals' outcomes may differ due partly to choice and partly to circumstances beyond their control, or luck. Roemer's view is that we should correct for differences across individuals that are a matter of luck, while preserving differences for which individuals are responsible. Two difficulties generally arise at this point. First, what is luck and what is responsibility? Second, how practically distinguish them? We will follow Roemer's approach and consider poor health as the result of bad luck and taste for leisure as the result of deliberate choice. Further, in order to take into account differences in health and ignore differences in taste for leisure in the social criterion, we will use an average parameter for the latter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we examine the non-welfarist approach, whereas in section 3 we present the welfarist approach, including the Rawlsian criterion as an extreme case, and we show why it does not provide desirable results. A final section concludes.
Non-welfarist approach
Let us consider a particular separable type of Mirrlees' utility function:
where u (·) and h (·) are continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and, respectively, concave and convex. x is disposable income, is labor supply and α is a parameter measuring the intensity of labor disutility. We can interpret αh ( ) in two different ways.
It can be viewed as measuring the physical or psychological hardship from working hours, or as the utility the individual gets from enjoying ¡ − ¢ hours of leisure, being the total available time. One could encompass these two aspects by rewriting the utility function as:
where ϕ L (·) is the utility of leisure and ϕ H (·) the disutility of effort. A particular form of this function could be: In their individual choice of both will use the same utility function (1) . However the social planner may decide to take into account the difference in α H but to ignore the difference in α L , choosing to employ the same value of α L for everyone, e.g. α 2 L . As a consequence, the objective function of the social planner would be:
where n 1 and n 2 are the relative number of types 1 and 2. Without loss of generality we can normalize these parameters such that higher productivity than types 1 and 2 but the same combination of α L and α H as type 2. The society consists then of three types of individuals: disabled and able lowproductivity individuals, and high-productivity able individuals. We denote them by 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The crucial point is that the three types have the same formal labor disutility α but type 1 has a relatively higher α H and, according to (2) , the social planner attaches a higher weight to her labor disutility.
In addition, we consider the case where disabled and able individuals may use their disposable income, which was denoted above by x, in different ways. In order to capture this idea, we use the following utility function:
where c i and d i represents two types of consumption goods. d i is a good for which disabled individuals have relatively higher needs (like health care). Accordingly, we is strictly concave and h (·) is strictly convex. 2 In a market economy, each individual maximizes:
where constant per-unit costs of production are assumed with one unit of effective labor being necessary to produce one unit of either good. w i represents the productivity of individual i, where w 1 = w 2 = w and w 3 = w h , with w h > w The disposable income y i = w i i is devoted to consumption of goods c i and
in terms of income, y 1 = y 2 < y 3 . That is, both disabled and able low-productivity individuals work and earn the same. The only difference is that they use their disposable income differently. Since disabled individuals have higher needs of commodity d, they enjoy lower consumption of commodity c than able ones. This may seem unfair and may provide some role for redistribution from able to disabled individuals.
As a benchmark let us look at the first-best solution. Given the quasi-linearity of individual utilities, we use a strictly concave social utility transformation G (·) that reflects aversion towards inequality. As just discussed the social planner acknowledges that the labor disutility of disabled individuals (i.e., type 1) does not have the same social cost as the labor disutility of the two other types and, accordingly, the labor disutility of disabled individuals is weighted more heavily in the social welfare function than that of able ones.
The problem of the planner is expressed now by the following Lagrangian:
where n i is the relative number of individuals of type i, and β i is the weight attached to the labor disutility of individuals of type i, with
In what follows, we will denote the argument of G by e U i , which differs from U i when the weight
The first order conditions (hereafter FOCs) yield:
In contrast to the laissez-faire, disabled individuals work less than able ones. This follows from the fact that the planner attaches more weight to their disutility of labor.
To achieve the first-best solution perfect observability of individuals' characteristics is required. We now consider a second-best setting where the planner is able to observe consumption levels of c i and d i (although not needsd i ), together with labor earnings y i (that is, y i = w i i , but not w i and i separately). As usual, we express the utility function in terms of the variables the planer is able to observe (i.e., c i ,
The first-best solution is no longer feasible because high-productivity individuals have incentives to mimic both low-productivity ones and, among low-productivity individuals, able individuals have incentives to mimic disabled ones.
In the second-best setting the social planner needs to take into account self-selection constraints (hereafter SSCs) in order to prevent individuals of a given type from applying for the tax-treatment designed for individuals of other types. Appendix A identifies the SSCs that need to be incorporated in the present framework. The second-best problem is then:
This is standard use. In the second-best framework it is convenient to express the problem in terms of the variables the social planner can observe (see Stiglitz (1982) ).
s.t.
(µ) :
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint, λ i (for i = 3, 2) stand for the Lagrange multipliers associated with the adjacent downwards SSCs, namely 3 mimicking 2 and 2 mimicking 1, and λ 31 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-adjacent downwards SSC, namely 3 mimicking 1.
Rearranging the FOCs, given by equations (B.1.1) to (B.1.9) in appendix B, yields:
The second-best levels of y 3 , d 3 and d 2 coincide with the first-best ones. There is no efficiency gain in distorting the choices of the high-productivity individuals, nor the choice of commodity d by the low-productivity able individuals. There is an efficiency gain in distorting the labor supply decision of type 2 individuals if by doing so we prevent high-productivity individual from mimicking them. It can indeed be shown that the SSC that prevents type 3 from mimicking type 2 individuals binds, and y SB 2 < y F B 2 . In addition, d 1 is higher and 1 is smaller than in the first-best. It is optimal to distort the choice of commodity d of disabled individuals, so that they consume more than in the first-best, and there are now two reasons why disabled individuals may be induced to work less: on the one hand, there is the concern of the planner for the labor disutility of this particular type (i.e., β > 1); on the other, it might be necessary to prevent high-productivity individuals from mimicking them.
The relationship between y 1 and y 2 (and, thus, between 1 1 . This last result seems particularly fair because the social planner wants the disabled individuals to work less than the able ones. 4 It can be shown that ifd 1 is sufficiently high and β sufficiently different from 1, the vector (c 1 , d 1 , y 1 ) that is not to be mimicked by type 2 individuals will include y 1 < y 2 . This is pretty intuitive.
As it is standard, the optimal allocation resulting from solving the above problems 
Welfarist approach
We have just seen that for the problem at hand the non-welfarist approach we use can be justified by the theory of responsibility. Furthermore it implies that in the second-best solution the disabled could be induced to work less than the leisure-prone individuals.
Yet, many economists have some problems with such an approach. They tend to prefer a welfarist approach wherein the disabled individuals would be given more weight than the two other types of individuals. We turn to this approach and show its implications in both the first-and second-best. The laissez-faire solution naturally does not change. Regarding the first-best, the problem of the planner is expressed by the following Lagrangian:
where α i represents the weight given to individuals of type i. These weights are assumed to be non-increasing with i.
The FOCs yield:
The equations for d and coincide with those obtained for the laissez-faire. In particular, disabled individuals are required to work the same amount as able ones. In order to determine c, note that:
The higher the weight α i , the lower G 0 i and, since G (.) is concave, higher utility
When the social planner weighs more heavily the utility of the disabled individuals (i.e., α 1 > α 2 ),
This stems from the quasi-linear utility specification. The weight given to individual 1 is not reflected by a lower labor supply but by a higher level of consumption of good c. With a more general separable utility function u (c) +
It is worth noting that the Rawlsian criterion would amount to equalize the utilities of the three types, with 1 = 2 .
Turning to the second-best, the problem of the social planner can be expressed as follows:
Rearranging the FOCs, given by equations (B.2.1) to (B.2.9) in appendix B, we obtain:
As in the non-welfarist approach, the second-best levels of y 3 , d 3 and d 2 coincide with the first-best ones. There is no efficiency gain in distorting the choices of the highproductivity individuals, nor the choice of commodity d by the low-productivity able individuals. However, it can be optimal to distort the labor choice of these individuals if by doing so high-productivity individuals are precluded from mimicking them. As before, the SSC that prevents type 3 from mimicking type 2 individuals is binding and y SB 2 < y F B 2 . Regarding low-productivity disabled individuals, it is optimal to distort their consumption of commodity
3 ). However, in contrast with the non-welfarist approach, it is not always optimal to distort their labor supply decision. It depends on whether there are incentives for high-productivity individuals to mimic them (i.e., whether the SSC that prevents type 3 from mimicking type 1 individuals is binding). and, hence, SB 1 = SB 2 . One interesting general result that emerges is that the weighted welfarist objective is unable to provide solutions in which disabled individuals are required to work less than their able counterparts, and they may indeed be required to work more. Disabled will instead be compensated with larger amounts of commodity d, because this is the only feature of their preferences a welfarist planner can use to distinguish them.
Conclusion
In this paper we have dealt with the design of an optimal social policy in a setting where different people have the same disutility for labor and thus in a laissez-faire economy they would work the same amount of time if they have the same productivity. Yet, the social planner would like to treat them differently because the labor disutility of some reflects a stronger preference for leisure whereas that of others stems from some physical or psychological pain from work.
The only way they can be distinguished is through their consumption basket that indicates the nature of their labor disutility: disability here implies some particular needs in consuming one of the goods. We consider two possible social criteria. One consists of giving more weight to the utility of the disabled and it thus generates a Paretian outcome. The other consists of giving more weight to the labor disutility of the disabled and this yields a non-Paretian outcome.
We show that the non-welfarist approach can be justified by using the dichotomy between characteristics of responsibility and characteristics of luck. Only the latter are used for the sake of redistribution. We also show that the non-welfarist approach can imply a lower labor supply requirement from disabled individuals whereas the welfarist approach is unable to generate such an outcome, regardless of the higher weight given to the utility of the disabled or the degree of concavity used to reflect redistributive concerns.
When relevant information about some individual characteristics is private, the social planner needs to take account of the so-called self-selection constraints. These constraints are incorporated in order to prevent individuals of a given type from applying for the tax-treatment designed for individuals of other types. The purpose of this section is to identify which SSCs need to be incorporated in the second-best problem. If the social objective involves redistribution towards the bottom we need only focus on downwards SSCs:
The first two constraints are the adjacent downwards SSCs (for i = 3, 2), whereas the last SSC is the non-adjacent one that relates individuals of types 3 and 1.
In most of the analysis of optimal non-linear income taxation, with social objectives that redistribute towards the bottom, the adjacent downwards SSCs are sufficient.
However, it is necessary to check whether this is the case in the present framework, given the complexity added by the existence of differential needs for commodity d.
From (A.1) and (A.2),
3) holds (Note this is a sufficient condition). Given the properties of the disutility of labor function h (.) (in particular, h 0 > 0, h 00 ≥ 0) and w h > w , 
It might still be possible that (A.3) is satisfied, except when (A.1) and (A.2) bind. In this case,
and (A.3) is violated. In view of this we need to incorporate the three SSCs in the formal second-best problem to make the mimicking behavior unattractive. 5 B Analysis of the pattern of self-selection constraints
B.1 Non-welfarist objective
The FOCs of the social planner problem with the non-welfarist objective used in this paper are:
Rearranging these conditions the second-best (hereafter SB) is characterized by equations (4) to (9) in the text. From (B.1.1) to (B.1.3), it follows that:
Moreover, the SSCs -equations (A.1) to (A.3) in appendix A -imply that:
Hence, 
. 6 We employ this notation for short in the appendix. SSC ij means the self-selection that prevents a type i individual from mimicking a type j individual, where i 6 = j. SSC 32, SSC 21 and SSC 31 are given by equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), respectively.
Note that y 2 > y 1 is now possible because β > 1. Using (B.1.1) to (B.1.3), the equation can be rewritten as:
Note that if
then the condition holds and y 2 > y 1 . Rearranging,
If n 2 ≥ n 3 , the sufficient condition holds. If n 2 < n 3 , then the sufficient condition does not hold but it might still be possible that the overall condition for y 2 > y 1 holds.
2. If SSC 21 and SSC 31 are binding, then λ 2 > 0 and λ 31 > 0. If y 1 > y 2 , the SSC 32 holds with strict inequality. However, if y 2 > y 1 , the SSC 32 is violated. The SB equations (6) and (8) (6) and (8) it is possible that y 1 > y 2 . Working with (6) and (8), and using (B.1.1) and (B.1.2), we obtain: 
B.2 Weighted welfarist objective
The FOCs of the social planner problem with a weighted welfarist objective, assuming non-increasing weights, are: 
